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Abstract 
This work aims at implementing new approaches for Virtual Identity (VId) in cloud environments. Our objective is to create an 
identity that could help in preventing the reverse of access chain in the cloud through hiding the main user identity. This means 
that, instead of executing a service for a known identity in cloud environment (unknown place), we hope to execute a service 
with an unknown identity (VId) in an unknown environment. For achieving the high degree of security and efficiency, we 
implement a new anonymous access for cloud environments using VId. This identity is implemented and verified using Multi-
precision Integer and Rational Arithmetic C/C++ (MIRACL library) either Identity Based Encryption (IBE) or Pseudonym Based 
Encryption (PBE) mechanisms. By this, a comparison between our protocols and the previous identity mechanisms used in cloud 
is conducted to highlight the main issues, and pros & cons for each approach. 
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1. Introduction 
In Virtual environments, anonymous communication and preserving privacy are complicated tasks. Most notably 
cloud networking which facilitates on-demand management and control of computing, storage and connectivity 
resources in the network, by automatically moving or scaling up or down the resources, required to distribute content 
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and applications. It has at least three challenges; first of all, data confidentiality and personal information and it 
should be resilient in the case of security breach in which some part of the system is getting hacked 1. 
Nowadays, we are experiencing an explosion in the volume of data that is created by social network users (i.e. 
YouTube, Facebook, Twitter ……). Those users share personal details, opinions, videos, pictures and very often 
their identities for each service with public or even their friends.  
 Therefore, the virtualized services access management over the Internet will be a critical technology for 
maintaining privacy and performance especially after transition to cloud computing. As keeping service provider 
assets secure is a strong approach to all parties, anonymous communications between users and virtual service 
provider became a critical issue for users to preserve their personal details. 
Classically, Identity is the equivalent term for (username + password) to access any application. Later on, the 
Identity is developed to use some features from users like user profile (age, gender…). Moreover, it is extended to 
use biometric information like fingerprint and iris. This means that, the required degree of security can adjust the 
complexity of identity used parameters. In some applications the trusting model could be enough to run/execute an 
application like P2P applications, while accessing banking account could require two factor or multi-factor 
authentications to confirm the user’s identities. 
International Data Corporation (IDC) defines Identity and Access Management in the Cloud (IAM) as a 
comprehensive set of solutions that are used to identify users of a system and control their access to resources by 
associating user rights and restrictions with an established identity2.  
 As users continue to depend on the virtual environments for delivery of services and more individuals are using 
multiple types of devices to access those services and applications, the need to hide who has access to any service 
will grow. Often, users suffer from password bore, having to create and remember at least one password for each 
service/application. Adding to the challenges of cloud networking security is the increasingly wide range of 
structured and unstructured data that is transferring across the network and the many types of devices used to access 
the network from any place. Service providers must now handle access from smart phones, tablets, PCs, and other 
form factors, often with different operating systems. Each device may access enterprise applications, mobile apps, 
social media, streaming video and traditional data each time in one access. This creates a highly sophisticated 
environment in which the service provider must control how and who has access to what and when. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, related works will be presented and reviewed. Section 
3, introduces identity challenges and work motivations. Section 4, presents the proposed virtual identity approaches. 
Section 5, discusses comparison and analysis for VId mechanisms. Finally, Section 6 will introduce the conclusion, 
and it will give future directions. 
2. Related Works 
This section is divided into two parts; the first one will review the identity in the cloud and the virtual 
environments. In the second part, the identity challenges and work motivations will be introduced, in addition to, 
extraction and analysis of an online survey with some questions about using identities in social networking and 
virtual environments3. 
2.1.  Identity in the Cloud and Virtual Environments  
In the Cloud Computing Technology Roadmap, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
highlighted this concern: “… the need for trusted identities and secure and efficient management of these identities 
while users’ privacy is protected is a key element for the successful adoption of any cloud solution.”4 
Identity Management process depends on two concepts the first one is Single Sign-On (SSO) and the second one 
is Federated Identity Management (FIM). SSO is a possibility of a user to log in once and gain access to numerous 
systems or networks available in a federation without being prompted to log in again5,6. 
Federated identity, describes the technologies, standards and use-cases which serve to enable the portability of 
identity information across otherwise autonomous security domains.  
Numerous identity and federation manager products that support federation via Security Assertion Markup 
Language (SAML) versions 1.1 and 2.0 are available. Actually, there are three major protocols for federated 
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identity: SAML, OpenID and OAuth. SAML7 is deployed in SSO systems, large enterprises, government agencies 
and service providers as their standard protocol for communicating identities across the Internet. SAML is an 
eXtensible Markup Language (XML)-based standard for exchanging authentication and authorization Simple Object 
Access Protocol (SOAP) messages between security domains, that is, between an identity provider and a service 
provider. Authors8 in this work are introducing an in-depth analysis of 14 major SAML frameworks and showing 
that 11 of them, including Salesforce, Shibboleth, and IBM XS40, have critical XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) 
vulnerabilities. 
OpenID is used to implement federated identity management in many web sites like Facebook, Microsoft, 
Google, PayPal, Symantec, and Yahoo. It is an open, decentralized user identification standard, permitting users to 
log onto different services with the same digital identity. In OpenID the user is authenticated using third-party 
services called identity providers through simple URL. Those users can choose their preferred identity providers to 
log in to websites that accept the OpenID authentication scheme. OpenID had a few interesting vulnerabilities like 
Phishing Attacks and Authentication Flaws. 
OAuth is the third major open standard protocol for federated identity. It is being used exclusively for 
authorization purposes and not for authentication purposes like OpenID and SAML. OAuth 2.0 relies entirely on the 
underlying transport layer security (SSL/TLS) to provide confidentiality and integrity and does not support 
signature, encryption, channel binding, and client verification. Therefore, it is described as an inherently insecure 
protocol. 
Finally, there is a growing number of other federated identity approaches. Higgins, is a new open source protocol 
that allows users to control which identity information is released to an enterprise or with diverse identity 
management systems.  Windows U-Prove, is Microsoft new identity meta-system that provides interoperability 
between identity providers and relying parties with the user in control. MicroID, is a new identity layer to the web 
and micro-formats that allows anyone to simply claim verifiable ownership over their own pages and content hosted 
anywhere. Liberty Alliance9, is a large commercially oriented protocol providing inter-enterprise identity trust. It is 
the largest existing identity trust protocol deployed around the world. SXIP9, is commercially available product that 
offers users the ability to control their own identity information and authentication in use with blogs and other 
applications. INames9, is a new service offering a centralized user controlled identity data store as well as providing 
authentication trust between enterprises. OpenSSO, is a Sun Microsystems open source version of their commercial 
product OpenSSO Enterprise. Ping Identity10, Next Gen Identity platform facilitates the trusted interaction among 
groups of application providers and consumers on the Internet, through APIs, and from any mobile or desktop 
screen. AnonyControl1 and AnonyControl-F1 are attribute-based privilege control scheme to address the user 
privacy problem in a cloud storage server. Relying on various cryptographic methods, three different approaches on 
how the Austrian eID system based on MOA-ID could be securely moved into the cloud without violating any 
privacy or data protection aspects11. 
3. Identity Challenges and Work Motivations 
It is convenient to use a different Virtual Identity for each service (so a different VId is used). In that way, each 
VId is only exposed meanwhile it is used to access to its associated service and a Virtual Identity only will contain 
the required attributes for accessing to one service (so less attributes will be exposed in a single access to a service). 
Furthermore, VId should be a string which does not include any information about user identity, terminal being 
used, or service to be accessed. On that way, any sniffer attacker in the access network is only able to know the 
home domain of the user, but no other information. 
3.1.  Analysis 
The aim of the survey is to develop/propose a new solution that enables personalized Identity for services, 
mapping Identity to user or service’s needs. Through this questionnaire3, there are a series of questions used to 
assess user requirements & user satisfactions and to suit their needs from using Identity over social & virtual 
environments. We received answers from two types of user: (users from inside our organization National 
Telecommunication Institute12 and users from outside). 
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 All target users have a good knowledge about social networking access (as the survey indicated 100%). Among 
them, about 70% prefer using one main identity for all social sites on base of creating one identity for each service 
automatically by the operators as shown in Fig. 1. (a). By this, the users are searching for an easy solution in order to 
avoid remembering many identities for all services. Fig. 1. (b) illustrates some questions samples and the answers 
globally indicate an average 70% of users are interested in privacy and virtual identity aspects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. (a) Samples of some identity background questions/answers in the online survey; (b) Samples of some identity security and privacy 
questions/answers in the online survey 
4. The proposed Virtual Identity Approaches 
Hereinafter, we implement two secure mechanisms for creating VId, they mainly used public-key cryptography 
for encryption and digital signatures. We will use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) to implement our approaches. 
The two solutions are common in using Private Key Generator (PKG) to calculate the VId. However, these 
approaches assume that a centralized Trust Authority (TA) is in charge of the private key generation. Thus, the 
anonymous communications are not anonymous to the TA. But, they are different in the encryption technique. We 
will implement the two mechanisms IBE and PBE using Multi-precision Integer and Rational Arithmetic C/C++ 
(MIRACL) library13 to evaluate the feasibility, performance and scalability of the proposed solutions. Figure 2, 
shows the two algorithms messages exchanges. 
4.1. The First Approach: Identity Based Encryption (IBE)  
Public-key based solution, such as Identity-Based Cryptographic (IBC) is an asymmetric key cryptographic 
technique, in which a user’s public key can be an identifier of the user and the corresponding private key is created 
by binding the identifier with a system master secret14.  
The first approach is based on the IBC, which can be traced back to the IBE firstly proposed by Shamir15. The 
construction of the proposed IBE scheme is shown in Fig. 2. (a): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. (a) Proposed IBE messages exchanges; (b) Proposed PBE messages exchanges 
b a 
a b 
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4.1.1. Steps of IBE protocol 
Since we use for this solution IBE and ECC, we have to set up the ECC parameters. The equation of the elliptic 
curve that we used is: y2 = x3 + ax + b mod p. The points of this curve will define a finite field; their number must 
be a prime number. In order to satisfy this condition, we fixed a prime number (p) and the parameter (a) in elliptic 
curve. And then we choose the parameter (b) in elliptic curve that satisfy this condition. We used a function in 
MIRACL that can calculate the number of the points in a finite field. The principle of the algorithm is as in Table 1. 
Table 1. Algorithm 1: Ecpg () 
Algorithm 1: Ecpg () 
1: Choose p and a 
2: Initialize b 
3: Calculate n 
4: if n is prime, n will be the proper parameter  
Else, increase b by 1 
5: go to 3 
a) System setup 
1- Each user send UID: User ID and Ser: Requested Service to Private Key Generator PKG.  
2- The Private Key Generator (PKG) or the trust Authority (TA) selects an elliptic Curve E over GF (p) where 
p is a big prime number. We also denote P as the base point of E and q (big number), as the order of P. 
The master Key X = (x1, x2….xn-1, xn). 
The public Key Y= (y1, y2…yn-1, yn) where yi=xi*P for i=1: n. 
b) Key extraction 
Given UID, Ser. PKG generates VId 
The Virtual Identity VId (VId=Original identity (mail, service) * Point on elliptic curve)  
The User public key UP=H*VId (H is a secure hash function)  
The User private key UD=S*UP (S is the master secret key of PKG) 
c) Signature generation 
The announcing user receives VId, UP and UD from PKG. In order to sign the user virtual identity VId 
using a private key UD derived from the PKG to determine VId and signature SVId, the announcing user: 
1- Receives VId, UP and UD from PKG 
2- Execute EcdsaSign (VId, UD) as in Table 2 to determine SVId. 
Table 2.  Algorithm 2: EcdsaSign (VId, UD) 
Algorithm 2: EcdsaSign (VId, UD) 
1: Generate n a large prime number 
2: Calculate d= UD mod (n-2) 
3: Computes Q = d* UP 
4: Select a statistically unique and unpredictable integer k in the interval [1, n-1]. 
5: Compute k* UP = (x1, y1) and r = x1 mod n. If r = 0, then go to 4. (This is a security condition: if r = 0, then the signing equation:  
s = k-1*(H (VId) + d*r) mod n does not involve the private key d). 
6: Compute k^-1 mod n. 
7: Compute s = k-1*(h (VId) + d*r) mod n where h is the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1). If s = 0, then go to 4. (If s = 0, then s-1 mod n does 
not exist; s-1 is required in iteration 2 of the signature verification.) 
8: The signature for the discovery message m is the pair of integers (r, s) = Sig (VId). 
9: Return Sig (VId) = (r, s) 
10: Publish (Sig (VId), n, Q) 
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d) Signature Verification 
Once the service provider receives the signed virtual identity VId, it asks PKG for the public key for 
checking the signed virtual identity SVId , Algorithm steps are given in Table 3.  
Table 3. EcdsaVer (VId, UP) 
Algorithm 3: EcdsaVer (VId, UP) 
1: Verify that r and s are integers in the interval [1, n-1]. 
2: Compute w = s-1 mod n and h(VId). 
3: Compute u1 = h(VId)*w mod n and u2 = r*w mod n 
4: Compute u1*UP + u2*Q = (x0, y0) and v = x0 mod n. 
5: Accept the signature if and only if v=r. 
 
e) Encrypt future communication 
If the verification of the signature is successful, the service provider SP generates Shared Secret Key Ks 
and sends it to user U. Otherwise it is discarded. 
After generate the pre-shared key Ks, We denote encrypting future communication (i.e, a message m) using 
pre-shared key Ks as EcdhEncrypt (m), Algorithm 4, Table 4. The resulting ciphertext is denoted by c. The 
decryption of ciphertext c using the same pre-shared key Ks is given as EcdhDecrypt(c), Algorithm 5, 
Table 4. 
Table 4 Algorithm 4: EcdhEncrypt (m); Algorithm 5: EcdhDecrypt (c) 
Algorithm 4: EcdhEncrypt (m) [Encrypt future communication] Algorithm 5: EcdhDecrypt (c) [Decrypt future communication] 
1: Generate a random number a א GF (p). 
2: Calculate multi_a= a.UP 
3: Publish (multi_a) 
4: Receive multi_b 
5: Calculate Ks=a*multi_b 
6: Encrypt m with Ks, {m} Ks 
7: Return c= {m} Ks 
1: Generate a random number b א GF (p). 
2: Calculate multi_b= b.UP 
3: Publish (multi_b) 
4: Receive multi_a 
5: Calculate Ks=b*multi_a 
6: Encrypt m with Ks, {m} Ks 
7: Return {m} Ks 
4.2. The Second Approach: Pseudonym Based Encryption (PBE)  
The second approach is based on Pseudonym Based Encryption, which was proposed for Key management for 
anonymous communication in mobile ad-hoc networks16. In this approach, user uses Pseudonym Based Encryption 
to calculate its own VId. The PKG will just compute the user’s private key which depends on its secret master key. 
The PKG will act as an authority which certifies that the user has the private key corresponding to his/her public 
key. Fig.  2.(b) shows PBE messages exchanges. 
The user sends to the PKG his/her identity (e.g., user@homeoperator.com), the requested service, the public key 
by choosing an ECC with a point P a generator of it and chooses his/her VId (as pseudonym). The PKG calculates 
the user’s private key UD and will not send the key pair (public/private) to the user because the UP and UD are 
already computed by the user. The user wants to be authenticated by SP; therefore he/she uses an Identity Based 
Signature (IBS)15 to calculate SVId and sends it with VId to the SP. The SP sends VId to the PKG and asks for public 
key corresponding to the VId. The SP verifies the SVId by decrypting it using the UP. If it retrieves the VId, then the 
authentication succeeds. At the end, the SP generates and sends a shared secret key to the user to encrypt future 
communication between them. 
We will implement the PBE using the same steps as done before in IBE except for the second step in IBE (as the 
trusting verified by the cloud service provider in this case). 
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1-  Each user sends UID: User ID and Ser: Requested Service VId: Virtual ID (Pseudonym), UP: User Public 
Key to Private Key Generator PKG. The PKG is in charge of the private key generation within an 
anonymous communication system. Therefore, the anonymous communications are not anonymous to the 
trust authority (TA).  
2- The Private Key Generator (PKG) or the trust Authority (TA) will just compute the user’s private key 
which depends on its secret master key. PKG selects an elliptic Curve E over GF (p) where p is a big prime 
number. The PKG calculates the user’s private key UD and will not send the key pair (public/private) to the 
user because the UP and UD are already computed by the user. 
Other steps will follow the same steps as described before in IBE. 
5. Approaches Comparison & Analysis 
As mentioned before about Federated Identity (FI) and password management, the three major protocols for 
federated identity are not yet suitable for providing the high level of  security and reliability to satisfy authentication 
demanded by important services such as financial institutions, governments, mobile operators and public services. 
Therefore, Table 5 shows the comparison between our proposed approaches and major protocols of federated 
identity. 
Table 5. Comparison between proposed approaches and major FI protocols 
                                Protocols       
 
Security Consideration 
Federated Identity Protocols Proposed Protocols 
OpenID SAML OAuth IBE PBE 
Authentication Using identity 
provider and 
Controlled by 
relying party 
Exchanging XML 
messages between 
service provider and 
identity provider 
Not for 
authentication 
purpose. 
Trusting between 
PKG and service 
provider 
Handshaking 
between PKG 
and service 
provider 
R
ek
ey
in
g 
Forward 
Secrecy 
Compromised by 
phishing attacks 
and 
authentication 
flaws 
Compromised by 
XML signature 
wrapping 
vulnerabilities 
Session fixation 
vulnerability 
flaw, does not 
support client 
verification and 
signature 
Dynamic policy 
updating through 
PKG 
Randomization 
of value K each 
login 
Backward 
Secrecy 
Irreversible to 
main identity 
Using identity 
based signature 
Main Purpose SSO for 
Consumers 
SSO for enterprise 
users 
API authorization 
between apps 
SSO and 
anonymous 
communication 
SSO and 
anonymous 
communication 
Overhead and complexity 10 messages for 
handshaking 
6 messages for 
handshaking 
10 messages for 
handshaking 
6 messages for 
handshaking 
5 messages for 
handshaking 
Dates From 2005 2001 2006 2015 2015 
No. of related CVEs 24 17 3 None None 
Protocols used XRDS, HTTP SAM,XML,HTTP 
,SOAP 
JSON, HTTP HTTPS, SSL, 
Elliptic Curve 
HTTPS, SSL, 
Elliptic Curve 
5.1. Security and Performance 
The proposed work uses IBC + ECC for Master Key and Private Key Generation.  Therefore, our approaches 
increase the level of security in order to prevent any form of attack and guarantees;  
x Non-Repudiation, Integrity, Privacy and Anonymity (ECC is based on pseudonym instead of identity 
which leads to assure privacy, anonymity and solve identity disclosure problem),  
x Dynamicity (It is assured by re-generate virtual identity for each service) and Identity Disclosure. 
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5.2. Scalability  
The results we got to create VId is around 40 ms and 32 ms for the principal functions for IBE and PBE 
respectively, using a computer machine (Intel Core 2 Duo CPU E8400 @ 3.00GHz x 2, memory 4G in Linux 
Ubuntu 12.10). We evaluated the time needed to create the VId by different number of users. Table 6 shows the 
results.  
Table 6. IBE and PBE scalability  
Number of users VId creation time  IBE VId creation time PBE 
1000 40 S 32 S 
5000 200 S 160 S 
10000 400 S 320 S 
50000 2000 S 1600 S 
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
This paper showed numerous features for VId and identity management in different environments to eliminate 
the need to maintain distinct user credentials for separate applications, therefore simplified administration and 
streamlined access to resources are satisfied. We suggest two protocols IBE and PBE for SSO and anonymous 
communication to help Cloud and Internet users to protect their privacy and private information from any 
disclosure. Furthermore, the paper conducts comparison and analysis between the proposed approaches and three 
major protocols for federated identity OpenID, SAML and OAuth. The features and advantages of the proposed 
protocols over the standard protocols are mentioned. One of the promising future works is to extend our solutions to 
include group communication and design security model to compare quantitatively the IBE and PBE with the 
approaches of related works.  
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